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ACCUSED CONFESSES IN ONE STATEMENT TO 
HAVING COMMITTED TWO SEPARATE CRIMES 
Duhamul v. The Queen 15 C.C.C. (3d) 491 
Supreme Court of Canada 
The accused confessed to police in one statement to have committed two 
armed robberies. He was tried separately for these robberies. At his 
first trial the Crown adduced the statement in evidence. A voir dire 
resulted in the judicial finding that the statement was inadmissible 
as it amounted to no more than "an alleged adoption through nods and 
statements of a statement made by a third party". The adoption, of 
course, was by the accused. The Crown's evidence against the 
accused was his confession. The exclusion of the statement did there-
fore result in the jury being directed to render a verdict of not 
guilty. 
On the second charge of robbery the accused was tried before a differ-
ent Judge and the same statement was adduced by the Crown. This Judge 
held, that the statement was free and voluntary and therefore admis-
sible. Although this is total conjecture on my part, the second Judge 
· probably restricted the test of admissibility to voluntariness on the 
part of the accused and there being no infringements of freedoms or 
rights that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Whether or not the content of the statement can be relied upon as 
being the truth is really up to the jury, the judge of the facts. The 
first Judge seemed to have been concerned about the reliability of the 
statement which is usually not considered in determining admissibil-
ity. Just because it is admitted in evidence does not mean that it 
amounts to proof of anything. 
In any event, the accused was convicted (obviously the statement was 
considered proof of the truth of its content) of the second charge of 
robbery. He appealed that conviction. His single ground of appeal 
was a principle in law, known as "res judicata". It basically means a 
matter or thing previously decided or adjudicated. We must consider a 
matter that has been judicially ruled upon as being final and the 
courts must (other than in appeal procedures) not be asked to rule on 
that very issue or matter again. In this case both courts had juris-
diction over the offence and, said the accused, the matter of the 
admissibility in evidence of the statement was judicially decided and 
that decision is final. 
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When a matter that has been judicially decided, is brought before the 
courts again, the other party to the proceedings can raise "issue 
estoppel", which simply means that the court is "es topped•' (stopped, 
barred, prevented or impeded) from dealing with it. This principle 
had until 1979* only applied to civil law. At that time the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that there is as much need in criminal law to 
prevent excessive adjudication as there is in civil law and confirmed 
that "issue estoppel" is also part of the criminal law. If it was 
not, there would simply be an "absence of the elements of finality or 
of identity with an issue" said the Court. Based on this reasoning 
the accused claimed that when the first Judge held that his statement 
was inadmissible the second one could not decide on that issue again. 
If the Crown disagreed and wanted to test the accuracy of that first 
ruling, it should have appealed the acquittal but not have raised the 
already decided issue in a subsequent trial. 
On the surface the accused's arguments seem sound and hard to defeat. 
However, both the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of 
Canada disagreed with the accused's position. 
It is quite complicated to determine when the doctrine marginally 
explained above, does apply. I will, therefore, attempt to simply 
give the practical reasons why the Supreme Court of Canada did unani-
mously decide that the principle should not be extended to judicial 
decisions made upon a~ dire. 
Currently a Provincial Court Judge may conclude upon a voir dire with-
in a preliminary hearing that a statement is not admissible:--D'espite 
the fact that the proceedings are a "hearing", a voir dire is a 
trial. If the doctrine was extended as the accused is suggesting, the 
consequence would be (assuming the accused is committed for trial, of 
course) that the trial judge would be precluded from determining the 
admissibility of the evidence. The Crown, when it fails at the 
preliminary hearing to have, for instance, a statement admitted in 
evidence, it has always been allowed to adduce the statement again for 
judicial consideration at trial. 
If the doctrine was extended to decisions upon.voir dires, it could 
also be very detrimental to an accused. For instance, if an accused 
admitted in one statement to a number of crimes which were going to be 
tried separately, then if in the first trial the confession was wrong-
fully admitted, the doctrine dictates that it would have to be 
accepted in all subsequent trials. 
* Gusheu v. The Queen 50 c.c.c. (2d) 417. Supreme Court of Canada. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the doctrine exists to 
prevent a person from being retried after an acquittal; not to be 
punished twice for one act of wrongdoing; that matters fully litigated 
are not reopened over and over; and avoid scandal arising from con-
flicting decisions. Therefore in the absence of being shown a clear 
advantage to extend the law as the accused suggested, the Supreme 
Court declined to develop the law in that direction. 
Appeal dismissed. 
The Crown was not blocked from relitigating the accused's statement. 
* * * * * 
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BREACH OF THE PEACE - FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
Hayes v. Constables Thompson and Bell - B. C. Court of Appeal, C.A. 
00525 
Mrs. Hayes, the plaintiff, visited a pub with her husband and her 
father. The husband nearly became involved in a fracas and the 
threesome was told that they "had enough" and would not be served 
any more alcoholic drinks. Mrs. Hayes raised cane when the drought 
was announced and raised some more in the parking lot when a bartender 
asked if they had taken any glasses with them. Mrs. Hayes even 
emptied her purse to prove her innocence. She followed the bartender 
back inside and could be heard "all over the pub". She refused to 
leave and police were called. A taxi was hailed and the three left 
peacefully. All was tranquil until Mrs. Hayes discovered that her 
wallet was missing from her purse. She and her companions headed back 
for the pub and turmoil seemed inevitable to the officers if the three 
would get inside. To prevent this, all three were placed under arrest 
by police for breach of the peace. 
Mrs. Hayes sued the constables and was awarded $2,000 for damages. 
The constables appealed the decision to the B. C. Court of Appeal 
claiming that the trial judge should have left the jury to decide if 
there were reasonable and probable grounds f Or them (police) to 
believe that a breach of the peace was about to take place. Secondly, 
the jury should have been left to decide if they (the officers) had a 
right to arrest the plaintiff under section 47 of the Liquor Control 
and Licensing Act when she threatened to re-enter the pub after being 
requested to leave. Not leaving these issues to be decided by the 
jury, the trial judge had erred in law, claimed the officers. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal firstly answered the question put to them in 
relation to section 47(2) of the Liquor Control and Licensing Act. It 
empowers a police officer to arrest a person without warrant, who 
enters a licensed establishment within 24 hours after he was requested 
to leave the premises, as well as any person suspected of contravening 
this prohibition. However, Mrs. Hayes had not entered the pub at the 
time of her arrest. The Court of Appeal interpreted the words 
"suspected of contravening subsection (2)" not to include in its 
meaning a suspicion that one is about to enter in contravention of the 
24 hour suspension. Furthermore, the officers had not relied on this 
provision to justify the arrest of Mrs. Hayes. They had arrested her 
for a breach of the peace and relied on section 31 c.c. for authority 
to do so. 
In view of her previous performance, any reasonable person could 
foresee that a tumultuous disturbance would result if Mrs. Hayes, in 
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her intoxicated condition , would have gotten inside the pub. 
Considering the circumstances at the time the arrest was effected, the 
officers had to have power to arrest for an anticipated or apprehended 
breach of the peace. Section 31 c.c. empowers the arrest of persons 
who breach the peace, are about to join in on an existing breach of 
the peace, or are believed to renew a breach of the peace. Semanti-
cally, section 31 C.C. is confined to existing breaches of the peace 
or ones that have actually taken place and are about to be renewed. 
It does not empower anyone to effect an arrest for the purpose of 
preventing an inevitable, anticipated or apprehended breach of the 
peace. However, legal scholars claim in their text books* that at 
common law anyone is empowered to arrest "where an imminent breach is 
reasonably apprehended". This was inferred from commentary by the 
English Court of Appealt the most significant portion of which 
records: 
It would be wrong if a constable (or any other 
person) had overwhelming evidence for believing 
that a grave breach of the peace was about to be 
committed in the immediate future but could do 
nothing to prevent it because no previous breach 
had occurred. 
On the basis of an analysis of all of the cases, the B. C. Court of 
Appeal held that if there is a power to arrest for an apprehended 
breach of the peace;-it is not included in section 31 C.C. Therefore, 
if the arrest of Mrs. Hayes was legal, it had to be so at common law. 
The B. c. Police Act (section 15) states that provincial constables 
are to carry out the powers, duties, privileges and responsibilities 
that a constable is entitled or required to exercise or carry out at 
law under any Act or regulation. The words "at law" include the 
~on law, held the B. C. Court of Appeal. Including municipal 
police officers in this, the Court quoted from the "Legal Status of 
Police" which states that such officers in B. C. "have the common law 
status of constable, as modified by the provisions of the Police 
Act". For this conclusion the Court relied on the decision by the 
Supreme Court of Canadatt in regard to the obstruction of an Edmonton 
City police officer when he prevented someone from confronting the 
then u.s.s.R. Premier Kosygin. At common law, said the Supreme Court, 
the officer was not only entitled but was duty bound to prevent the 
imminent breach of the peace. Lacking the reliance by the Supreme 
Court of Canada on any specific statutory provision empowering the 
Edmonton officer to arrest the person who wished to forcefully 
confront the Russian Premier, the B. c. Court of Appeal inferred that 
* The Law of Torts, 7th ed., 1983, Prof. Street at pg. 82. 
t R. vs. Howell [1982] Q.B. 416 
tt Knowlton vs. the Queen [1974] S.C.R. 443 
- 6 -
its decision was based on common law. Adding to all of this the oath 
of office of the constables who arrested Mrs. Hayes ("to preserve the 
peace and prevent offences") the Court concluded that in B. C. peace 
officers have "the accompanying common law power to arrest for an 
apprehended breach of the peace". 
Although the appellants (the constables) won their argument on the 
issue of law, the B. C. Court of Appeal declined, in the circumstan-
ces, to set aside the verdict of the jury. The cost of a new trial 
would be much higher than the nominal damages ($2,000) awarded by the 
jury. 
Comment: It must be remembered that all the B. C. Court of Appeal has 
decided is that at common law a peace officer is empowered to arrest 
a person for an apprehended breach of the peace. Some misplaced 
enthusiasm or confidence may result from this decision. The Court did 
not alter the definition of breach of the peace nor did it deal with 
the detention subsequent to arrest. These issues are, in my view, one 
of the most misunderstood powers police officers have to preserve the 
peace. Perhaps what has been outlined previously should be repeated. 
A breach of the peace is not any disturbance or any offence. The 
actual or imminent incident must be an affray in which there is a 
threat of physical harm to a person. In other words, there must be a 
threat of violence attached to the affray. 
Furthermore, a breach of the peace is not an offence in itself and the 
powers to arrest is one similar to a protective custody. Custody 
should not extend much, if any, beyond the time period during which 
there is the belief on reasonable and probable grounds that the 
prisoner will cause, join in or renew a breach of the peace. 
* * * * * 
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ENTRAPMENT 
Regina v. Coupal - County Court of Vancouver, No. CC841620 February 
1985. 
According to the testimony of the accused a year after he broke up 
with a girlfriend, the mother of the girl contacted him. Despite the 
fact that the accused had not had any contact with the woman for one 
year, she approached him and said that she was suffering of terminal 
cancer and, to get some relief from discomforts, she asked him to get 
her some cocaine. At first the accused refused. However, the phone 
calls and urgent requests continued and increased as time went on. 
Finally he had caved in and agreed "to keep an eye out for her". 
The approaches continued and the request for cocaine extended to 
suggestions for the accused to be her bodyguard while she made trans-
actions which would be profitable to both of them. She promised him 
$700 for one deal and said that her share was needed to pay for 
doctors and medication to combat her cancer. 
The accused claimed that to get the woman off his back he finally 
agreed to take delivery of some package containing cocaine and take it 
to her. She stressed that he should sample the content before accept-
ing the_ package. When the accused arrived with the package at the 
designated hotel he was told by the woman to present himself as a drug 
dealer to the person she was about to introduce him to. She then took 
him up to a room and the accused was introduced to an undercover 
police officer. What occurred from thereon in according to the police 
witnesses was conceded to be the accused. 
The accused claimed to have been the victim of entrapment and reques-
ted the Court to enter a stay of proceedings as continuation would 
amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Furthermore, the lady 
who had set him up was not produced by the Crown and not available to 
testify for the Crown or the defence. Also this fact warrants a 
judicial stay of proceedings claimed the defence as no fair trial 
could be had. Only the lady could corroborate or verify the accused's 
testimony. The accused had no criminal record and denied being a drug 
dealer. 
Police evidence revealed that before the accused's involvement, the 
"lady's" home was searched and nine charges of possession of stolen 
property had resulted and one of possession of cocaine. She 
approached police and offered to deliver a drug dealer in return for 
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them dropping the charges against her. 
Despite a lack of enthusiasm on the part of police she persisted that 
she could deliver a deal of 2 pounds of cocaine. She was told to go 
ahead but that no promises could be made regarding the charges against 
her. All the officer promised to do was to mention her cooperation to 
the prosecutor should she be successful. After the accused was 
charged all charges against the lady were dropped and all property and 
money seized during the search of her home were returned to her 
($61,000 worth). 
First the Court dealt with the accused's claim that his rights to a 
fair trial were infringed as the person who allegedly enticed him to 
commit a crime was not made available by the Crown. The defence 
relied heavily on a similar case also tried in the Vancouver County 
Court* where a judicial stay of proceedings was invoked. In that case 
the disappearance of the witness (who the defence claimed had 
entrapped the accused) and an assurance that she did not have to 
testify, were conditions of the deal. In this case no such deals were 
made. The witness was out of the Court's jurisdiction and when 
contacted by police, she had refused to attend the trial. She feared 
for her safety, particularly as there had been a "bomb incident" since 
the charges were preferred against the accused. In the other case, 
there were a number of discrepancies between the testimony of police 
and that of the accused which could only be cleared up by the absent 
witness. In this case there were no such discrepancies. 
In relation to entrapment this Judge disagreed with his "learned and 
experienced brother" that it was a recognized defence in the province 
of British Columbia. He felt as many others, that the Supreme Court 
of Canada did not clear this issue up in the Amato case t and that 
therefore the B. C. Court of Appeal decision in that case is still 
binding on the B. c. Courts. 
The Judge decided that a judicial stay of proceedings could be entered 
any time the facts offend against the principles of justice and abuse 
the process of the Court. Entrapment is only one of such injustices. 
There were, in this case, no injustices justifying a stay of 
proceedings. 
* 
t 
R. v. Ross, 
publication. 
R. v. Amato -
publication. 
* * * * * 
Application denied. 
Trial to be continued. 
Unreported - see page 36 of Volume 18 of this 
see page 34, Volume 1 and page 32 of Volume 8 of this 
51 c.c.c. (2d) 401. 
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BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT NO AUTHORITATIVE PERSON HAS 
INFLUENCED ACCUSED IN MAKING A STATEMENT 
Regina v. Munroe, Cariboo County Court, Prince George No. 00985/84 
The accused was convicted of impaired driving and failing to blow and 
appealed these convictions. He had been involved in a minor accident 
in early morning hours on the parking lot of a hospital. A security 
guard in uniform was at the scene when police arrived. The constable 
asked who had been driving and the accused had readily answered that 
it was he. The usual (demands, warnings, accompanying the constable, 
etc.) happened and the charges resulted. Without the admission by the 
accused that he was the driver, the Crown simply had no case and the 
admissibility of that admission was therefore challenged. The defence 
claimed that the hospital security guard should have testified that 
he, prior to the arrival of the police, had done nothing to influence 
the accused to make the admission. The trial judge had rejected this 
submission and had admitted the statement in evidence. 
The Judge of this County Court who heard the accused's appeal disa-
greed with the trial judge. The kernel of his reasons for doing so 
was that the Crown witness (the officer) could not say if the uni-
formed guard had spoken to the accused. The accident had been very 
minor and was non-reportable, yet the accused was at the scene with 
the guard. 
An inference was drawn by the County Court Judge that the guard had in 
some way detained the accused or forced him to stay around. Therefore 
the Court held: 
I think the onus is on the Crown to prove and to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that a person who 
prima facie may have been in a position of author-
ity, did not say or do anything to influence the 
appellant. 
The Court hastened to add that not every person in the police station 
or all prison guards who may have had something to do with the accused 
must be called. However, unless the absence is adequately explained, 
"persons in apparent authority who are present at or immediately prior 
to the giving of a statement and who, by the circumstances of the 
particular case might be inferred to be persons who were in a position 
to influence the accused to make a statement", ought to be called to 
prove voluntariness on the part of the accused. 
Appeal allowed. 
Conviction set aside, 
acquittal substituted. 
* * * * * 
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UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. Johnson, County Court of Cariboo, No. 0291, Dawson Creek 
December 1984. 
The Consumer Protection Act creates an offence for purchasing tax 
refunds for less than 85% of the anticipated refund. The Ministry of 
Consumer and Corporate Affairs received several complaints about the 
accused, an accountant, for purchasing refunds for considerably less 
than 85% of the taxpayer's entitlement from the tax department. The 
Director of the investigative branch appointed two personnel to 
investigate the complaints. These investigators swore informations 
and obtained two search warrants from a Justice of the Peace: one for 
the accused's home, the other for his bank. Consequently he was 
charged with violating the Consumer Protection Act and admitted for 
trial upon a preliminary hearing. 
The accused, during a voir dire at his trial, argued that the Act 
under which he was charged and the procedures outlined therein are 
indistinguishable from those in the Combines Investigation Act. The 
latter were declared without force or effect by the Supreme Court of 
Canada as they were inconsistent with the right to be protected 
against unreasonable search and seizure*. The provincial Consumers 
Act provides for the Director of Consumer and Corporate Affairs to 
order investigations. Investigators can proceed by "entering the 
business premises and examine any record relevant to the alleged 
contravention and/or obtain a search warrant from a Justice of the 
Peace and search any place in which it is believed are such records". 
The Supreme Court held that two ingredients are prerequisite to such a 
warrant being consistent with the reasonable search and seizure clause 
in the Charter: (1) the warrant must be issued by an impartial person 
and (2) the section authorizing the issuance of a search warrant must 
require that the sworn information includes reason to believe that an 
offence has been committed. Section 48 of the Consumer Protection Act 
does not require such reason to be included in the information. 
Therefore, the section was held to be inconsistent with section 8 of 
the Charter and consequently invalid. 
The accused now wanted his documents returned to him and requested the 
Court to so order as a remedy to the infringement of his right (s. 
24(1) Charter). The Court declined to do so. The accused was 
reminded that he had the option anytime after the execution of the 
warrant, to apply to the Court (County or Supreme) to quash the 
warrant and have the seized documents returned to him. The documents 
* Hunter v. Southam Inc. - page 12 of Volume 18 of this publication. 
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were now before the Court as evidence in criminal proceedings against 
the accused and the sole issue was the admissibility of them in 
evidence_. 
It was already determined that the legislation under which the warrant 
was issued, was of no force and effect due to being inconsistent with 
the Charter. All that was to be decided now was whether admitting the 
documents in evidence would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. To that end the events leading up to the investigation 
were reviewed. 
Several letters of complaint received by the ministry had triggered 
the investigation. There was no evidence that, prior to taking out 
the warrant, any investigation took place or that even statements were 
taken from the complainants. The Director ordered an investigation 
into the "possibility" that the accused had committed an offence. The 
statutory provision of the warrant was immediately used before the 
investigators could swear that they had reasonable and probable 
grounds for believing that the accused committed an offence. The 
warrant included authorization to seize a wide variety of documents 
while the information upon which the warrant was obtained did not 
justify the seizure of such documents. 
All documents were thoroughly examined and eventually the accused was 
charged with offences under the Consumer Protection Act and several 
counts of theft and fraud. Even if the search provision of the Act 
was not contrary to section 8 of the Charter "the paucity* of informa-
tion the investigators had and the sweeping nature of the search 
warrant and its execution" made the search unreasonable. In other 
words, had the search warrant been issued under the Criminal Code and 
the seizure been so sweeping as in this case with no justification 
sustained in the information, the search would have been unreason-
able. Said the Court: 
The investigators in the present case did not 
merely commit an error. The procedures they 
elected to pursue amounted to a wholesale trammel-
ing of the s. 8 Charter rights of the accused. 
The Court appeared to have little sympathy for the accused and did not 
accept several claims he made in his testimony. Nevertheless, the 
documents seized were ruled inadmissible in evidence. 
* * * * * 
* paucity - smallness of quantity 
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IMPAIRED DRIVING - DEFENCE OF 
Regina v. Swark, County Court of Vancouver, No. CC841102 
The accused, after drinking three glasses of wine, and two "incredibly 
strong" screwdrivers in a short period of time, got into her car and 
attempted to drive home. She struck a car the driver of which was 
attempting to park. With this car in pursuit she drove on for a 
couple of blocks and rear ended a car that had stopped. To all 
witnesses she appeared intoxicated, but also frightened, upset and 
concerned. In any event, the accused was convicted of impaired 
driving and appealed that verdict. 
The accused testified that while looking for work she spotted an ad 
for a housekeeper. She arranged for an interview at the prospective 
employer's home. The interview lasted 1 1/2 hours during which the 
middle aged interviewer poured drinks generously. Eventually the man 
began to ask her very personal questions and made sexual remarks. 
When the accused expressed shock the man exposed himself to her and 
tried to grab her. Believing she was about to be raped she escaped 
and ran out onto the street. All the accused remembered was that she 
was terrified and wanted to go home; ••• "getting away and being safe. 
Getting back to my dogs where I would be protected". According to her 
testimony, her recollection of things afterwards was quite sketchy. 
The accused claimed that the defence of necessity should have been 
available to her. The Provincial Court Judge (the trial Judge) had 
held that there had been plenty of opportunity for the accused to 
assess her situation whence she got onto the street to see whether 
there were any alternatives open to her so she would not have to 
drive. Failure to weigh the alternatives does not amount to a defence 
of necessity. In other words, there was insufficient "urgency in the 
peril that the only recourse was to break the law". 
The County Court Judge agreed with the trial judge. He found that the 
accused was not fleeing her attacker but the scene of the attack. She 
was not pursued and her anxiety was one of escaping an unpleasant 
experience. 
* * * * * 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction of Impaired 
Driving upheld. 
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DOES A PRIVACY ACT AUTHORIZATION INCLUDE POWER TO 
SURREPTITIOUSLY ENTER PREMISES TO PLANT EQUIPMENT? 
Supreme Court of Canada - December 1984. 
The Courts of Appeal of British Columbial, Alberta2, and Ontario3 
expressed varied views in response to the question whether an authori-
zation to intercept private communication includes authorization to 
surreptitiously enter premises, be they homes or places of business, 
to install the equipment necessary for such an interception. 
The British Columbia case was appealed and as promised on page 35 of 
Volume 18 there would be a synopsis of the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision. 
The Interpretation Act states that a person who is empowered to 
perform a certain act is ipso facto empowered to do those things 
ancillary to that act. For instance, the law gives a peace officer 
powers to arrest in certain circumstances but does nat say you can 
transport that person, book him into holding units, etc. The latter 
acts, although recognized at common law, are ancillary to the powers 
to arrest. The statutes are simply not exhaustive in that they do not 
cover all aspects and contingencies. 
Some Courts have held that surreptitious entries are a power ancillary 
to the authorization to intercept private communications. Others felt 
that if such entry is necessary, particularly when it involves a home, 
the Crown must apply to have permission included specifically in the 
authorization. 
There are also judicial opinions that the very enactment is exclusive-
ly designed to protect privacy and Parliament would have included the 
matter of surreptitious entries if it had wanted interceptions of 
private communications to go as far as to intrude someone's most 
private place. 
In the B. c. case, police entered the home of one of the accused and 
installed a monitoring device. The authorization did not include 
consent for such procedure. The propriety of police action became an 
issue when the Crown adduced evidence obtained directly and indirectly 
from the interception by means of this device. The defence claimed, 
of course, that the evidence was unlawfully obtained and that by 
virtue of the provision in section 178.16 c.c. the evidence was 
inadmissible. The trial Judge, as well as the B. C. Court of Appeal, 
allowed the evidence to be admitted. 
1 Lyons, Prevedosos and McGuire and The Queen; 2Reference re an 
Application for an Authorization, page 11 Volume 17; and 3The Queen 
and Papelia et. al., page 13, Volume 17. 
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That decision as well as that of the Alberta Court of Appeal were 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The reasons for judgement are very detailed and interesting. The 
aggregate of the majority judgements is no less than 110 pages in 
length. The Court reviewed legal history and doctrines fundamental to 
the Court's decision. Out of the seven Justices who made up the coram 
one did not participate, four joined in the binding decision and two 
dissented. 
The kernel issue was the lawfulness of the interception. There is no 
doubt that the officers trespassed when they installed the equipment 
in the home without being specifically empowered to do so by statute 
or the authorization. The Supreme Court of Canada responded to this 
submission by saying that Part IV.I of the Criminal Code (Invasion of 
Privacy) is "a mini code within the codified criminal law". There-
fore, when that mini-Code speaks of an interception that was lawfully 
made it refers to means of interception in accordance to its own 
provisions and not to conformity with other parts of the Criminal Code 
or any other law. Said the Court: 
Indeed, once Parliament has granted the power to 
authorize and once that power has been exercised, 
the authorized conduct in law would no longer 
amount to trespass. 
The Supreme Court reviewed how Parliament had devised procedures to 
obtain judicial authorization, approved the use of certain equipment 
thereby supplying peace officers with appropriate means to carry out 
something that otherwise would amount to a crime. Surely, concluded 
the Court, Parliament should not be taken to have made all of these 
provisions and then leave those who must carry out the interceptions 
without "appropriate means and authority to carry them out." 
Dealing with the means of intercepting private communications and the 
use of equipment (observing that if not used in a certain way the 
approved equipment could not function as an interception device), the 
Court said: 
• • • Parliament cast the section broadly so as to 
empower the Court in its discretion to authorize 
the placing of the "device" inside the premises 
designated in the authorization whether or not a 
trespass might occur and whether or not the owner 
of the premises was the person whose communications 
was to be intercepted. 
(Emphasis is mine.) (Also note that Court referred to owner of 
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premises. I assume the Justices did not refer to the landlord but the 
occupier of the premises). 
The Court continued by saying that the mini-code (Privacy Act) is 
bilateral in nature and therefore Parliament has authorized judges to 
include in the authorizations "such terms and conditions as the judge 
considers advisable in the public interest". This, of course, to 
maintain a reasonable balance. 
In the case before them there was no provision in the authorization to 
enter any premises, yet police had entered a home to install a 
monitoring device. The Court said that the authorization was suffici-
ently broad to empower the officers to do as they did. 
In my view the Supreme Court advised that the Crown ought to apply to 
have officers empowered to enter premises to plant and maintain 
devices, if the need is known at the time the application is made. It 
seems that if no such provision is included in the authorization but 
the need arises, the police have ancillary powers to enter premises to 
intercept communications as they were authorized to do. 
This is also apparent when reading the appeal of the decision by the 
Alberta Court of Appeal where the same questions were put by means of 
reference. The Supreme Court of Canada said: 
An authorization given by a judge under Part IV.I. 
of the Criminal Code authorizes by necessary 
implication any person acting under the authoriza-
tion to enter any place at which private communica-
tions are to be intercepted to install or service a 
permitted listening device ••• provided such entry 
is required to implement the particular authoriza-
tion... unless the authorization includes limita-
tions or prohibitions of such entry. A judge in 
giving an authorization has jurisdiction to 
expressly authorize a person acting under the 
authorization to enter any place at which private 
communications are to be intercepted to install or 
service a device, provided such entry is required 
to implement the particular authorization. 
* * * * * 
The appeal by the accused 
in the B. c. case was dis-
missed. Conviction of 
conspiracy to import a 
narcotic was upheld. 
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DECEPTION CAUSING SEARCH TO BE UNREASONABLE 
Regina v. Cameron, B. C. Court of Appeal, C.A. 001541 
The Crown appealed the decision of the County Court of Westminster to 
acquit the accused of possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking (see page 3 of Volume 15 of this publication). In the 
event you have no access to that Volume, I'll repeat the circumstances 
and the County Court's reaction. 
A parcel addressed to the accused containing two pounds of marihuana, 
was intercepted by Customs Officers. Police had one of their officers 
dress up as a mailman and deliver the package. Prior to him making 
the delivery a search warrant was obtained by means of an information 
which stated that the officers had grounds for believing on good 
information that there were narcotics in the accused's home. Of 
course, when they swore to the information the goods had not arrived 
at the accused's home. The officers and the Justice of the Peace knew 
this. This caused the County Court Judge to be disturbed. He held 
that the warrant was invalid, the search unlawful and the narcotics 
(although marginally within the limits of police deception) were 
actually planted in the accused's home by the Police/mailman. The 
evidence was excluded, the accused was acquitted and the Crown 
appealed. 
The Crown conceded that the search warrant should not have been issued 
as the applicable provisions of the Narcotics Control Act is so worded 
that the narcotics should have been in the house at the time of the 
application. In other words the package should have been delivered 
firstly and then the warrant should have been applied for. However, 
the trial judge had held that the search was unreasonable and conse-
quently the evidence obtained thereby inadmissible. This especially 
as police and the justice knew that their practice was irregular and 
illegal. The Justice had simply been sympathetic and accommodating 
while he should have been acting judicially. Actually the trial judge 
implied that there was some plot to act unethically and irregularly 
against knowing better. This had apparently been the reasons why the 
trial judge gave a resounding "Yes" to the question if the administra-
tion of justice would be brought into disrepute if he admitted the 
evidence of the marihuana. 
The Crown submitted that there was no evidence upon which the judge 
could have concluded that there was any manipulation as described 
above. 
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The transcript of the trial showed that the officer who applied for 
the warrant had been incredibly candid about the matter. He volun-
teered to know that some justices do not grant a search warrant in 
these circumstances while others will. It also showed that on this 
issue defence counsel needed not to do anything. The trial judge 
conducted quite a thorough examination of the police witness with 
expressions strongly indicating that he disapproved of the practice. 
The Court of Appeal did observe how the police/applicant had sworn 
that .. there is a narcotic in the dwelling house", while he knew that 
the very narcotic upon which he based that belief was not there. 
However the rest of the affidavit was an accurate statement of facts 
and, said the B. C. Court of Appeal, there is no reason to . call the 
affidavit false. There was no evidence to conclude that there was any 
collusion between police and the justice said the Court. If the 
Justice honestly believed that a warrant could be issued in these 
circumstances that is not "'utterly unreasonable". Arguments could be 
raised to support such view, although, hastened the Court to add, such 
views are erroneous. 
The warrant should not have been issued and it was therefore invalid. 
However, that does not mean that the search was unreasonable or that 
the evidence should be excluded. Agreeing with its Alberta counter-
part* the B. c. Court of Appeal held that an illegal search is not 
necessarily unreasonable in terms of s. 8 of the Charter. Even if it 
was unreasonable, then the test under s. 24(2) of the Charter must be 
applied to determine the admissibility of the evidence. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that the marihuana should have been 
admitted in evidence and that the exclusion was an error in law. 
As the trial Judge had indicated strongly that but for the exclusion 
of evidence there would have been a conviction, the Court of Appeal 
allowed the Crown's appeal. 
Acquittal was set aside and conviction for 
possession for the purpose of trafficking 
was substituted. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Heisler (1984) 11 c.c.c. (3d) 475 
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INDECENT ASSAULT - RAPE - SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Regina v. Cook, B. C. Court of Appeal, Victoria CA23/84, May 1985 
The complainant, a 20 year old woman, testified how she offered to 
drive the accused's truck as he was too intoxicated to drive. The 
accused, a 50 year old man, had been out fishing with the complainant 
and was supposed to drive her to her car. On the way the accused made 
physical sexual advances and was rejected. Finally he turned the 
ignition key off and changed places with the complainant. He preven-
ted her from getting out of the truck, drove her onto a side road, 
pulled her clothing over thereby baring her private parts and penetra-
ted her. She fought back and when he slumped down she assumed he had 
ejaculated. Medical examination confirmed the penetration and sperma-
tizoa was found in her clothing. 
The accused's version of the events was quite different~ He said the 
complainant had not objected to his sexual advances and she had become 
sexually aroused. She had driven down the side road and laid down on 
the seat, pulled her clothing over and had thereby invited him to have 
· intercourse with her. He had not been able to achieve an erection, 
did not penetrate her and had aborted his attempt to reach a sexual 
climax. Furthermore he testified that he had a vasectomy years ago 
and he could not ejaculate spermatozoa. 
The accused was convicted of sexual assault and appealed the convic-
tion. 
The B. c. Court of Appeal observed that the Criminal Code provisions 
related to ordinary and sexual assaults, which became effective in 
January of 1983, fail to set boundaries between the two. The Court 
further observed that what now may amount to a sexual assault would 
not necessarily have been an indecent assault under the old provisions 
of the Criminal Code. The Court gave an interesting example. In 1982 
a fell ow by the name of Burden* placed his hand on the thigh of a 
woman sitting next to him on the bus. He was charged with indecent 
assault under the now repealed provision of the Criminal Code. The 
B. c. Court of Appeal had agreed with the trial judge that the assault 
was not indecent and had set aside the accused's acquittal, but 
substituted a conviction of common assault. The Court now used this 
case as an example and said that such an assault might now "well be 
categorized as a sexual assault ...... 
* R. v. Burden. See page 16 of Volume 5 of this publication. 
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To demonstrate the meaning of a sexual assault the Court said that 
mere intentional touching may amount to assault. It then follows ••• 
that a light but intentional sexual touching 
may constitute a sexual assault. 
The Court recognized that this ruling by itself could result in 
"trivializing the offence" of sexual assault. Every touch of approach 
or uninvited kiss is not necessarily a sexual assault. To distinguish 
between such matters the Court said: 
The better approach, to my mind, rests on a theory 
of implied consent to an initial mild sexual 
touching, if preceded by a sufficient acquaintance-
ship. Therefore, there would be an implied consent 
to each further reasonable advance in touching, 
until such time as consent is explicitly refused. 
The touching thereafter, would, of course, amount to assault. Whether 
or not such an assault is a sexual one is not "solely a matter of 
anatomy" warned the Court. 
• • • a real affront to sexual integrity and sexual 
dignity may be sufficient. 
Although the Court did not endorse the theory with apparent enthusi-
asm, it acknowledged defence counsel's version of the distinction 
between -an assault being conunon or sexual. He had suggested (to 
support his defence that his client was too drunk to form a specific 
intent) that for an assault to be sexual the assaulter must intend to 
obtain some sexual gratification, some form of reaction (rejection or 
acceptance) by which the person assaulted acknowledges the sexual 
nature of the assault. 
Perhaps it is reasonable to infer that the Court agreed that in 
fitting circumstances, this is one way by which the distinction can be 
established. 
In conclusion the Court agreed with the trial judge that the touchings 
by the accused in this case were capable of amounting to sexual 
assaults. 
The defence then claimed that the indictment was faulty. If the 
accused had been charged with rape as the offence used to be, all the 
evidence would have been part of the act of rape. Now the accused was 
charged with one count of sexual assault. In view of the Court 's 
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description of this offence he committed four separate sexual 
assaults. Three while the truck was driven by the complainant and the 
most serious one when it was parked. The Crown had for lack of a 
better term, thrown all of them in the pot and left the jury to select 
any one of them to convict the accused. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that although the defence seemed techni-
cally to be correct, no injustice was done. Had the trial judge 
ordered that the indictment should be separated into four counts of 
sexual assault, no jury hearing the evidence in this case would have 
concluded that the minor touchings were without consent and the major 
one, while parked, was with consent. 
Obviously, the verdict of guilty was based on the major incident, the 
act of intercourse. 
The accused also claimed that the trial judge had not directed the 
jury how drunkenness may have contributed to the mistaken belief that 
the complainant consented. 
Defence counsel seemed to have danced around the issue of drunkenness 
but obviously did not press it. Therefore, the B. C. Court of Appeal 
did not decide on this. However, the trial judge had been quite 
specific on this point. He had said to the jury "You just take that 
from me, as a matter of law, drunkenness ••• is not a legal defence, so 
dismiss it from your minds". 
When criminal intent is an element to an offence then, whether 
drunkenness is a defence, depends on the category of the offence. If 
the offence is one that requires "specific" rather than "general" 
intent, then drunkenness may be a defence. Rape was an of fence 
requiring general intent only, therefore drunkenness was not a 
defence. An honest but mistaken belief that there is consent, was a 
defence. In this case the defence did not actually raise the defence 
of drunkenness but simply said that the accused's intoxication "might 
have had an effect on the formation of an honest belief that the 
complainant had consented". 
The B. C. Court of Appeal decided that the matter of the defence of 
drunkenness in respect to the new offence of sexual assault was not 
before them. This, if there is such a defence for the offence of 
sexual assault, there was no evidence of a degree of intoxication that 
could have triggered consideration for it. This left the Court to 
decide if the accused's intoxication could have caused a misconception 
on his part, in respect to consent. In other words, considering the 
circumstances and his condition, might he have had an honest belief 
the complainant consented? The Court rejected the possibility of 
this. 
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When the accused was cross-examined on the details of the event and in 
particular on whether the complainant had objected, he had replied: 
I wasn't so drunk that I would not have known if 
she was objecting to my advances. 
As there was no level of intoxication that could have served as a 
defence if such defence exists for sexual assault, the Judge's direc-
tions to the jury did not amount to a misdirection. Secondly, there 
was nothing sufficient to find that the accused's judgement to deter-
mine if he had consent for his sexual activities with the complainant, 
was impaired. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction of sexual assault upheld. 
* * * * * 
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THEFT OF MONEY ON DEPOSIT IN A BANK 
OWNERSHIP 
The Queen and Bissoondatt, B. C. Court of Appeal, CA 001987, April 
1985. 
The accused was an employee of one of the Canadian chartered banks. 
One of his functions was to buy and sell gold for bank customers. 
The accused had completed numerous transactions for a Mr. N, and 
apparently the latter was satisfied with the services the accused 
provided. At least, this is indicated by Mr. N. transferring his 
account to the branch to which the accused was moved by his employer. 
Mr. N. had literally tens-of-thousands of dollars on (term) deposit 
at the accused's branch. Without going into details as to trans-
actions, the accused bought and sold gold for Mr. N. and for this 
purpose withdrew and deposited funds from Mr. N.'s accounts. In all 
cases, it appears that the accused received specific instructions from 
N. in respect to the transactions. However, after two years of this 
relationship and arrangement, the accused cashed in two of Mr. N. 's 
term deposits and failed to deposit proceeds from a gold sale into the 
N. account. This was done without Mr. N.'s consent or knowledge. 
A few months after the accused had acted without instructions, as 
related above, he went to Mr. N.'s home and told him about this. The 
statement was hardly a confession of theft as the accused told N. that 
he had taken the money and placed it in a safety deposit box. This 
was on a Friday and it was agreed that on Monday the money would be 
removed from the deposit box and be made available to N. However 
sometime over that weekend Mr. N. demanded promissory notes from the 
accused. 
The accused managed to drag his feet in living up to the agreement for 
a couple of weeks and when N. finally persisted the accused confessed 
he had taken the money and distributed it among his relatives. This 
resulted in a conviction of theft of money, the property of Mr. N. 
The accused appealed the conviction using a very common defence for a 
charge of theft like this. He claimed the Crown had failed to prove 
that the money he took from the bank and distributed was in fact the 
property of Mr. N., who was specifically named in the indictment as 
the owner. 
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When money is deposited in a bank, it becomes the property of the 
bank. In essence, the depositor purchases credit. Therefore, the 
accused did perhaps steal from the bank but not from Mr. N. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Bank was the owner of 
the money the accused stole but disagreed that ownership must be 
proved precisely as alleged in the information (as it used to be). 
For instance, in one case* the Crown proved that jewelry belonged to 
Westwood Jewellers while the information alleged a theft from Westwood 
Jewellers Limited. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the 
accused's acquittal was improper. 
Said the Supreme Court of Canada: 
If, however, the name of the alleged owner is 
mentioned in the indictment, is it correct to state 
that, unless ownership in that person is proven by 
the Crown the charge must be dismissed? I am not 
ready to accept that this is a true statement. 
An information must be sufficient to identify to an accused what 
alleged transaction it is that is claimed to constitute the offence. 
In this case the accused received reasonable information of the trans-
action which amounted to the theft alleged. The B. c. Court of Appeal 
concluded: 
Here there were sufficient circumstances to indi-
cate to the appellant the true nature of the 
charge. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction of theft upheld. 
* * * * * 
* Little & Wolski v. The Queen (1975) 19 C.C.C. (2) 285. 
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WHO, FOR THE PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL LAW, IS THE OWNER OF PROPERTY? 
Regina v. Naziel, The County Court of Vancouver, Smithers, No. 44102, 
September 1984 
The accused deliberately drove into a car driven by a Mr. D. The car 
Mr. D. was driving was owned by a Ms. T. She testified as to her 
ownership during the accused's trial for mischief. The information 
outlining the offence, alleged that the accused had damaged "the auto-
mobile of Mr. D.". The Crown took the position that since Mr. D. had 
possession of the car, he was the owner for the purpose of the 
offence. This was so said the prosecutor, on account of section 517 
c.c. which, in essence, states that he who ~ law has possession of 
property shall, for the purpose of criminal law, be deemed to be the 
owner of that property. The words, shall be deemed, left no alterna-
tive but to allege that Mr. D. was the owner of the car, said the 
Crown. In view of the direct evidence from the actual owner of the 
vehicle, the Provincial Court Judge held that the evidence had not 
supported what was alleged and he acquitted the accused. The Crown 
appealed. 
The Canadian courts are not in agreement on the meaning of s. 517 
c.c. The Alberta Court of Appeal, and long before that, the B. c. 
Supreme Court, gave the section a sensible and clear interpretation. 
Those Courts noted that the section does not speak of someone who 
lawfully possesses property but who does so "by law". The former 
means that it is a possession the law does not prohibit while the 
latter implies that there must be a specific law that provided for the 
possession. For instance, in one of the cases a person had shoplifted 
something that was in possession of the store by a lease of floor 
space arrangement. The charge of theft named the store as the owner 
while in fact the goods were owned by the lessee. The Crown had taken 
the position that the business contract between the store and the 
owner made the store the owner "by law". Not so said the Court and 
held that the arrangement only accommodated the store to take over 
from the owner in caring for property rather than for the purpose of 
having the use of it. For instance the law provides specifically that 
the registered owner of a car must be considered the owner, while in 
fact someone else may have purchased it and is compensated for the use 
of the vehicle by the registered owner; in cases of backruptcy a 
person is appointed to administer and possess assets; the executor of 
an estate (although he must administer it in accordance with a testa-
ment or other provision) does by law possess the estate; a police 
officer does by law possess contraband he has seized, etc. In many of 
these cases and particularly in the case of an estate, it is difficult 
for someone to claim actual ownership. The Courts held that s. 517 
* R. v. Scott (1973) c.c.c. 109 
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c.c. was designed only to cover such situations and not civil arrange-
ments like lending, leasing or like contracts. The Alberta Court of 
Appeal* reasoned very similarly and its conclusions were identical to 
those of the B. C. Supreme Court. 
In 1969, however, the B. C. Court of Appeal had also given its opinion 
on section 517 C.C.**· It disagreed with what the B. C. Supreme Court 
and its Alberta counterpart had to say. It did not only extend the 
term of "by law" to include contractual stipulations but also where 
"control or custody is derived by implication of law". The Court 
actually held that the section states that a person who has "lawful" 
possession of property shall be deemed to be the owner. 
That leaves us in view of the compelling language (shall be deemed 
••• ) to wonder if we must consider in all cases of of fences against 
property, if the person who had possession of the property at the time 
of the offence must be named as the owner in the information. 
The County Court held that if the contrary had not been proved by Ms. 
T.'s testimony, Mr. D. would have been the owner. Howe~~r, in view of 
that testimony the Crown proved ownership in one person and alleged it 
to be with someone else. 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
** R. v. Hogen (1969) 4 c.c.c . 140. 
- 26 -
IS TAKING THE LAW IN ONE'S HANDS ALWAYS A CRIME? 
Regina v. Cotswick, County Court of Vancouver, No. CC840124, August 
1984. 
The accused, a free miner, became involved in a number of disputes 
with a mining company in regards to mineral claims. The accused lost 
his arguments in court and had to move equipment across the property 
owned by the company and over a road the company claimed to own. The 
accused asked for a key to the gate and was refused. He then checked 
the statutes and also discovered that the road was built with public 
money. This means, according to the Highways Act, that the road was a 
public road. 
The accused, using his own equipment, simply removed the gate and 
found himself charged with mischief. Of that "I am not guilty" said 
the accused as he claimed to have acted with legal justification or 
excuse, or with colour of right (see section 386(2) C.C.). 
The Court found that the accused had made proper inquiries re the 
status of the road and sought legal advice. In other words he did not 
just have some personal opinion on the matter. Therefore the 
accused's belief that he had a right to traverse the company road was 
an honest one. He therefore had "colour of right". However, is such 
right sufficient to take the law into one's own hands? Surely there 
must have been legal ways to gain access to that road without having 
to bust the gate. 
The Court responded that it does not encourage the activities of the 
accused but taking the law into one's own hands "is not the same as 
saying that to do so one commits a crime". Said the Court: 
There are circumstances where it is appropriate at 
common law that there be an abatement of nuisance. 
One can think of many circumstances where conduct 
honestly and reasonably believed by a person to be 
illegal and wrong and eroding that person's public 
right, steps taken to remove that nuisance will not 
constitute a crime. 
The Court concluded that although the accused may well be wrong 
civilly, his honest belief in a set of facts invoked the benefit of 
section 386(2) c.c. 
Accused acquitted. 
* * * * * 
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HOUSE PARTY - UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY 
Regina v. Foulger and Res. - 18 c.c.c. (3d) 78 County Court of 
Westminster, B. C. 
A wild party was hosted in an apartment. Things got out of hand, beer 
bottles were thrown from the balcony and damage was done to the 
premises. Shortly after the two accused arrived and had a few beer, 
police came on the scene. The tenants were arrested, the names of all 
"guests" were taken and the two accused were convicted of: 
• • • with intent to carry out a common purpose, 
unlawfully assemble and conduct themselves when so 
assembled so as to cause persons in the neighbour-
hood of the assembly to fear, on reasonable 
grounds, that they would disturb the peace tumultu-
ously ••• (s. 64 c.c.) 
The accused appealed this conviction claiming that it was not suppor-
ted by the evidence in that "their presence amounted to nothing more 
than mere passive acquiescence" to what was going on. According to 
the Supreme Court of Canada* such presence at the scene of a crime 
does not make a person a party to the crime. However, in the case 
before the Supreme Court of Canada, the crime was rape. The Supreme 
Court had held that unless a person aids, abets or encourages the 
principal offender, his presence alone does not render him criminally 
liable. 
The County Court Judge held that the case the defence depended on was 
distinguishable from this unlawful assembly situation. The criminal 
act alleged against the accused was one of being part of an assembly 
and the conduct of that assembly. In other words, being present as 
part of an unlawful assembly is sufficient to convict under section 64 
C.C. Quoting the Court of Appeal of Englandt the Court described at 
what stage an assembly becomes unlawful: 
The moment when persons in a crowd, however peace-
ful their original intention, commence to act for 
some shared common purpose supporting each other 
and in such a way that reasonable citizens fear a 
breach of the peace, the assembly becomes unlaw-
ful ••• 
The common purpose was to have a party and the assembly became unlaw-
ful when beer bottles were thrown from the balcony. The accused 
* Dunlop and Sylvester v. The Queen (1979) 47 C.C.C. (2d) 93 
t R. v. Caird et. al. (1970) 54 Gr. App. R. 499 
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were part of that assembly" 
Appeal dismissed. 
Convictions upheld. 
NOTE: This case was decided in 1982, and apparently did not surface 
until now. The editorial note in the "Canadian Criminal Cases" reads: 
"This case only recently came to our attention, but was thought to be 
of sufficient importance to report at this time". 
* * * * * 
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WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 
Seems that the ongoing question whether the writ of assistance is a 
document that can withstand a constitutional test ran into more split 
judicial views. It seems a race between the judiciary and parliament 
who is going to kill this controversial means of empowering searches. 
The Minister of Justice has stated that the "writ of assistance" 
legislation would be repealed. The Federal Court had, in pre-Charter 
times, already protested to have to act administratively in response 
to "an order" by a minister for a writ of assistance to be issued*. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that all warrantless searches are 
unreasonable unless shown to be otherwise and added that one of the 
tests whether a document empowering a search is the equivalent to a 
warrant is that it is issued judicially**. This was seen by many as 
the judicial death blow to the writ of assistance as the Federal Court 
has no discretion in the matter and shall issue the document upon 
application. However, a few weeks after the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision, the Federal Court (trial division) came out with a surpris-
ing rulingt. Contrary to the earlier views by his brothers, this 
Federal Court Judge held that the granting of a writ of assistance is, 
despite the lack of discretion, nevertheless a judicial function. He 
considered the writs desirable and necessary in a free and democratic 
society. 
One week after this Federal Court decision, the Ontario Court of 
Appealtt ruled predictably in view of the test devised by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The granting of the writ, said the Ontario Court, is 
an administrative rather than a judicial act and all relevant 
legislation is of no force or effect as it infringes on the right to 
be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. No one has ever 
claimed that law was a precise science! 
* * * * * 
* See page 3 of Volume 14 of this publication 
** See page 12 of Volume 18 of this publication 
t Re Danielson and Sterba and Cousineau 16 c.c.c. (3d) 332 
tt R. v. Noble 16 c.c.c. (3d) 146 
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LEGAL TIDBITS 
Reasonable Search 
The accused was stopped in a roadblock set up to check documents such 
as driver's licence and registration papers. All was found in order 
and the accused was free to go. Shortly after information was 
received via C.P.I.C. that the accused is a suspected cocaine dealer. 
He was overtaken and stopped. He allowed his vehicle to be searched. 
A quantity of cocaine was found and when asked: "What is this?" the 
accused gave an inculpatory statement. The accused was tried for 
importing and possession for the purpose of trafficking. The admissi-
bility of the cocaine and the statement became an issue. The road-
block was not in contravention of the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure. However, the police were not justi-
fied in pursuing the accused and searching him on the basis of infor-
mation in a computer. The search was warrantless and without reason-
able and probable grounds. Therefore, the statement tbe accused made 
when the cocaine was found should not be admitted in evidence. The 
cocaine, however, was admitted in evidence as it was not established 
that admission would bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute. 
(R. v. Moretto, 14 C.C.C.(3d) 427.) 
* * * * * 
Validity of Warrants for Disorderly Houses 
The Criminal Code provides that a peace officer, upon a report to a 
justice of grounds for believing that disorderly house offences are 
being committed, may be issued a search warrant (s. 181 C.C.). The 
officer need not swear an information and the only prerequisite is 
that the officer and not the justice, does believe or is satisfied 
that such an offence is taking place. This provision, held the 
Ontario High Court of Justice is of no force or effect as it is incon-
sistent with the right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure. The justice is simply not acting judicially when issuing a 
warrant under the provision of s. 181 C.C. as he does not make any 
decision on sworn evidence. The Court held that s. 443 c.c. sets out 
the normal and appropriate standards for granting a search warrant. 
Consequently the search warrant was quashed. 
(Re Vella et. al. and The Queen 14 c.c.c. (3d) 513) 
* * * * * 
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Is Assumption that Goods are "Hot" 
Enough to Convict for Possession? 
A man found in possession of $1,300 worth of roof panels confessed 
that he knew they were "hot". This was not because the vendor told 
him so, but was concluded from him knowing the actual value and only 
having paid $150 for the goods. However, the Crown could not provide 
the person who sold the panels nor could it prove that they were 
stolen. The owner of the property and its origin was a mystery. The 
man was nevertheless convicted of possession of property obtained by 
an indictable offence. He appealed and the Alberta Court of Appeal 
held that the accused's belief that the goods were "hot" was inade-
quate to prove that they were obtained by an indictable offence. 
Appeal was allowed and acquittal was entered. 
Please note that the Court did not negate the doctrine of "wilful! 
blindness" used to infer that a possessor of property had knowledge 
the goods were stolen. In this case there was possibly no lack of 
evidence to prove knowledge. But in addition the theft must be 
proved. 
(Regina v. Elliott 15 c.c.c. (3d) 194.) 
* * * * * 
Taking of Blood Samples from Unconscious Suspect 
The Manitoba Blood Test Act states that a doctor who has grounds to 
believe that the patient being treated has been drinking and drove 
within the last two hours may take a sample of blood to determine the 
patient's blood-alcohol content. In this case the patient · was in a 
one car accident, he smelled of an alcoholic beverage and he was 
unconscious. The doctor who had taken some blood for hospital pur-
poses had upon request also taken some for the police. The accused 
claimed that the provincial Blood Test Act is inconsistent with the 
Charter and that the doctor's intrusion into his body for the purpose 
of collecting evidence was an unreasonable search and seizure. 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal held that the legislation was not incon-
sistent with the Charter and that the doctor's action did not amount 
to an unreasonable search. 
(R. v. Ramage 16 c.c.c. (3d) 182) 
* * * * * 
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Justices of the Peace - Independent Judiciary 
On page 3 of Volume 19 of this publication is a synopsis of reasons 
why the Ontario High Court of Justice held that a Justice of the Peace 
in their province is not independent and can therefore not preside 
over a trial. The Ontario Court of Appeal has now reversed that 
decision and held that in addition to the tenure of employment 
arrangement, the tradition and the oath of office must be considered. 
It appears that it is business as usual for the Ontario J.P. 's. 
(Reference re Justices of the Peace Act.) 
(Re Currie and Niagara Escarpment Commission 16 c.c.c. (3d) 193)). 
* * * * * 
Disciplining One's Child 
A rebellious 13 year old boy was taken upstairs by his father who 
said: ".I am going to learn you to grow up and be a man and not a 
bum". The boy was hit on his bare behind with a leather strap, four 
times. He then had something abusive to say to his Dad and this 
resulted in a further strapping. This punishment left five bruises 
and Dad was convicted of assault causing bodily harm. Dad submitted 
in his appeal that section 43 of the Criminal Code excused him as he 
was merely correcting his child; furthermore the assault had not 
caused bodily harm. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal said that the 
defence of correcting a child is only available if the force used is 
reasonable. In this case the defence was not available. The Court 
did, however, agree with the father that he had not caused bodily 
harm. The bruises were transient and trifling. The conviction was 
reduced to that of simple assault. 
(R. v. Dupperon 16 c.c.c. (3d) 453) 
* * * * * 
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Taking Hair Sample by Threat of Force -
Admissibility of the Evidence 
A home was broken into and someone was sexually assaulted in the 
home. A suspect was arrested and was asked for samples of his hair 
for comparison with hair found in the house. If he was not prepared 
to give the hair police threatened to take it by force, if necessary. 
The suspect allowed a comb to be put through his hair and did, upon 
request, pluck a few hairs himself. The accused appealed his convic-
tion for B & E and sexual assault claiming the taking of the hair was 
an unreasonable search and seizure. Not so, held the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. The arrest was valid and police may search a prisoner and 
seize anything that will afford evidence. In any event, even if the 
search and seizure was unreasonable in the circumstances, admitting 
the hair exhibits in evidence would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
Conviction Upheld. 
(R. v . Alderton 17 c.c.c. (3d) 204) 
* * * * * 
Disturbing a Religious Worship Service 
Communion in a Roman Catholic parish would by edict of the priest, be 
administered to congregation members standing up instead of kneeled 
down. Some members objected strongly and kneeled anyway during 
communication. They were not served and were convicted of disturbing 
a religious worship (s. 173(2) c.c.). The Supreme Court of Canada 
held that the section was not intended to cover situations of this 
kind. "Disturb" in the section means conduct that is disorderly in 
itself. If this was not so, then the word "anything" in the section 
could render the author of the most trivial distraction to be crimin-
ally liable. 
Acquittal Ordered. 
(Smoke - Graham et. al. v. The Queen 17 c.c.c. (3d) 289.) 
* * * * * 
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Using Authority to Search for Liquor to Seize Drugs 
Police officers observed an open liquor bottle in a car and had, 
consequently, power to search the vehicle under the Ontario liquor 
laws. Narcotics were found and charges were preferred accordingly. 
Officers conceded they searched for liquor but expected to find 
narcotics. The defence, of course, claimed the search was unreason-
able and urged that the narcotics be excluded from evidence. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal held that the lawful search was not converted 
into an unreasonable search because the officers expected also to find 
drugs. 
Evidence allowed. 
(R. v. Annett 17 C.C.C. (3d) 332.) 
* * * * * 
Forfeiture of Firearm 
The Criminal Code stipulates that a firearm used in an offence must be 
ordered forfeited by the Court (s. 446.1(1) C.C.). A man was convic-
ted of carelessly storing a firearm (s. 84(2)C.C.) and the Court 
ordered the weapon forfeited. The accused appealed the forfeiture on 
the basis that the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had held that the 
offence involving a firearm that triggers (no pun intended) the 
forfeiture must be one of active process rather than a passive one. 
The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench agreed that the section of the Code 
obviously refers to an active use of a firearm in the commission of an 
offence. 
(R. v. Annas 17 c.c.c. (3d) 383) 
* * * * * 
Weapon returned to 
accused. 
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Distinction Between Causing Bodily Harm and Wounding 
The accused's victim suffered a broken jaw and ribs. He also suffered 
a ruptured eardrum and the ear canal was full of blood. The accused 
appealed his conviction on a charge of aggravated assault by 
wounding. It is well established that for wounding the breaking of 
the skin is an essential ingredient. The accused argued that a 
perforated ear drum is not sufficient to constitute wounding. 
Furthermore such perforation can be caused by infection and the Crown 
failed to show that it was the result of the assault. The Alberta 
Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. The breaking of the eardrum 
was sufficient to justify the conviction and the latter submission was 
rejected as conjecture. 
Conviction of wounding upheld. 
(R. v. Littletent 17 c.c.c. (3d) 520) 
* * * * * 
Freedom of Religion - Carrying of Ceremonial Daggers 
A man charged with assault was of the Sikh religion and appeared for 
his plea carrying his ceremonial dagger (kirpan). The Judge ordered 
the accused to take the dagger off. The case was adjourned for trial 
and the accused petitioned the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench to 
instruct the lower trial court that the accused could wear this 
religious symbol in the courtroom. He claimed the order to remove the 
dagger infringed his freedom of religion. His religion dictates that 
any baptized member of the Sikh religion must wear the dagger. The 
Court of Queen's Bench did not issue the order the accused sought. 
The trial judge having the public interest in mind, may order all 
weapons to be removed to ensure that the process is not thwarted and 
to maintain security in the courtroom. 
(Re Singh et. al. and The Queen 18 c.c.c. (3d) 31) 
* * * * * 
